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This book sets out to offer a comprehensive assessment of 
Russia’s strategy in the Arctic. But it is aptly titled “Arc-
tic strategies” in the plural, and the author makes it clear 
that Russia does not have a comprehensive strategy in the 
form of an integrated and coordinated policy. Even though 
a document entitled “Strategy for development of Russia’s 
Arctic zone” was adopted in 2013—after the book had been 
completed—this observation still stands. That being said, 
there is no lack of official statements stressing the Arctic’s 
significance for Russia and Russia’s importance for the 
Arctic. The North has for a long time played an important 
role in Russia’s statehood and identity. Nevertheless, the 
exact delineation of the Russian North, High North, or—
increasingly—Arctic, is ambiguous and contested. This 
uncertainty is reflected in the vacillations in administra-
tive borders and responsibilities, all well analyzed in the 
book. Although the Russian Arctic is populated by many 
small indigenous groups, indigenous policy plays a much 
less central role than in, say, Canada. Title to land is not an 
issue.
Even though the North and the Arctic are presented as 
something special in Russian political discourse, in real-
ity developments there are very much a consequence of 
broader policies or are connected to what is happening else-
where. In line with this understanding, a substantial part 
of the book is devoted to broader issues, but with Arctic 
implications. Russia’s negative demographic development 
is well known, but it has particular implications for the 
High North, which is already sparsely populated, contrast-
ing with the expansive vision of the country in the Arctic, 
heard in official statements and seen in some development 
programs. There the emphasis is on “economic conquest by 
osvoenie, massive population settlement” (p. 51), whereas 
many economic actors prefer a fly in–fly out system.
Climate change is of course a global issue, but it has 
particular repercussions in the Russian North, notably 
degradation of infrastructure due to melting permafrost. 
Even if such observations are now commonplace, the cost 
of adaptation does not seem to be taken into account in 
projections of social and economic development (p. 88).
The discussion of legal disputes in the Arctic is definitely 
non-alarmist. “The patterns of cooperation are therefore 
clearly prevalent, even among competitors” (p. 109). This 
statement is supported by a case-by-case review of salient 
legal disputes. Also the military development in the Arctic 
is put into a broader perspective: the Russian build-up tak-
ing place is seen as part of a global dilemma the Russian 
military is facing, in which means correspond neither with 
goals, nor with real needs.
“Interpreting the Arctic as a key economic resource is the 
main driver of Russia’s interest in the region, even trumping 
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its security objectives” (p. 135). This is a bold statement and 
it is difficult to test the validity, precisely because there is 
no coherent policy. But there can be no doubt that resources 
are one important driver. An interesting question, which is 
pursued in the book, is how commercial interests interact 
with state security objectives. A case in point is the ambiva-
lent attitude to foreign companies, which are needed but not 
desired. The commercial attractiveness of many Arctic pro-
jects is questioned. This corresponds well with a generally 
weakened Arctic hype that can be seen also in other parts of 
the region. Nevertheless, many promising investment oppor-
tunities remain, but they require advanced technologies, 
skillful management, and capital.
One of the most dynamic sectors in recent years has been 
shipping on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which connects 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans but also serves destinations 
along the coast of Siberia. Moscow wants to see more inter-
national use of the NSR to help finance infrastructure and 
icebreakers. The most promising customers are connected 
to extraction of raw materials and energy, but there are also 
many factors that limit international interest. In this sector 
too, the Russian ambitions are high, but the financial issues 
have not been solved.
This book is very useful as a comprehensive discussion 
of Russian thinking, policies, and challenges in the Arctic. 
It puts them into perspective and the overviews and con-
clusions are very readable in themselves. But the book goes 
farther. It gives a sometimes quite detailed presentation of 
current developments. One good thing here is the meticu-
lous rendering of sources, very helpful for students and 
scholars who want to pursue particular questions. However, 
some of the details, particularly in the chapters dealing with 
legal and economic matters, are wrong or outdated, or their 
presentation is inaccurate, partly because the sources are 
questionable. Sometimes old plans or proposals are pre-
sented as descriptions of the current situation. The book 
may therefore not be suited as an “encyclopedia.”
For example, the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong is not the 
world’s largest, as stated on p. xvi; the summary of Sval-
bard’s history on p. 107 is very imprecise; the largest ice-
breaker in the world, Fifty Years of Victory, does not belong 
to the Northern Fleet (p. 121), but to the civilian Atomflot; 
and the Vidayevo base is hardly an example of military-
civilian rapprochement (p. 123), as Gazprom was forced to 
change to another location, Teriberka, for its planned ter-
minal. The discussion of the Russian views on the status of 
the Svalbard archipelago is mixed with bilateral Russian-
Norwegian issues on the mainland, where the Spitsbergen 
Treaty has no relevance (p. 125). The United States is not 
going to overtake Russia’s position as the world’s largest 
gas exporter very soon (p. 148), but it may become the larg-
est LNG exporter. It is correct that Russian gas output was 
reduced dramatically in 2009, but not because of produc-
tion problems, as inferred on p. 142, but because of a drop 
in demand in both export and domestic markets, caused 
by the financial crisis. Gazprom does not plan to build the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline (p. 142)—it has been in operation 
since 1999 (but there has been talk about constructing a 
second branch). Most of Fedinskiy High is not on the Nor-
wegian continental shelf (p. 143). Presentation of offshore 
and onshore exploration issues is mixed in a way that 
makes it impossible for the reader to understand what the 
figures refer to (p. 149). BP cannot revive the Arctic agree-
ment with Rosneft (p. 151), because the main elements were 
included in the deal between Rosneft and ExxonMobil 
(but other Arctic projects for BP cannot be excluded). Two 
legal issues concerning navigation on the Northern Sea 
Route have been confused: the status of straits—of which 
there are several—and the right of coastal states to regu-
late traffic within the exclusive economic zone if it is partly 
ice-covered (p. 170). The system and level of payment for 
going through the NSR were changed from 2012 (p. 177), 
and the allegation of discrimination (p. 172) is outdated, 
even though present practice is not transparent; territorial 
borders and state sovereignty are confused with exclusive 
economic zones and exclusive resource rights (p. 168). The 
new Northern Sea Route Administration, which was set up 
in Moscow in 2013, does not have the wide power described 
(p. 183). The new nuclear icebreakers will be operated by 
Atomflot, not by FESCO or the Murmansk Shipping Com-
pany (p. 186), and the floating oil storage Belokamenka is 
not in Arkhangelsk (p. 204), but in Murmansk.
Such mistakes, coupled with a sometimes superfi-
cial review of developments and uncritical use of sources, 
are disappointing in a book that has much good analysis. 
The closing words contain an interesting, but ominous, 
hypothesis: “…the cost of an Arctic-centered development 
model is probably higher than is estimated by the Russian 
authorities, and the relevance of this choice could be bru-
tally undermined by developments in the international and 
domestic arenas” (p. 210). It seems that the hypothesis may 
be tested even sooner than the author had anticipated.
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